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I'd like to ask you all a question on the current public perception on Iraq.

Throughout all the political debates, media coverage, and general public opinion on Iraq, the overwhelming theme/belief is that what is currently happening is a complete disaster and a mess. Why is that the prevailing belief?

I've been there, studies counter-insurgency fights and principals and looked at some historical examples of counter-insurgencies (both successful and unsuccessful), and can only come to the opinion that the war is actually going quite well from a military stand point. I just can't understand why public perception is the complete opposite and would like some viewpoint to help me understand it.

I think it is because all you hear on the news is how many soldiers were killed that day or the latest scandel. No one talks about the small victories, aside from people like Michael Yon who are just now gaining noteriety.

For starters:

- It's not clear what we are fighting for, so it's not clear how to say we are winning.

At first, the government explanation was that we would occupy Iraq (a) to free the Iraqis from Saddam, and (b) to eliminate Saddam's stocks of poison gas which might have threatened surrounding countries, and (c) to stop his nuclear bomb program, which was said to be almost ready, and (d) because (it was hinted that) Saddam had either planned or facilitated the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. That all seemed like nonsense (as it has turned out to be), so I read Perle, Wolfowitz, Kristol, and Harris. I was first astounded by Harris's essay in Tech Central Station (a kind of web magazine for conservatives businessmen who care about technology) arguing that this was a "world-historical moment" when the US could remake the entire world to suit us. That phrase, "world-historical moment" is right from Hegel, and went into some of the craziest of German thinking in the 20th century. A creepy signal. Then I read Josh Muravchik's NY Times OP Ed that said we were seeing, in 2002, a "democratic tsunami" sweep the middle east. It seemed to me that the civilians running the DoD had an idea that we would take Iraq, modernize it, install tolerance, secularism, and democracy, all because Iraq was the least religious country in the region.

I have read enough history to doubt that an army can change culture and custom just by kicking out political leaders.

Perle and friends argued that our success in Iraq would quickly sweep out the anti-democratic regimes in Iran and Syria in a sort of optimistic domino effect.

The day after we took Baghdad, it became clear that the government had no idea how to govern, much less reconstruct, Iraq. (See Bremer's book, in which he admits that there was no plan. Consider that before Bremer, Garner's team arrived to find that all the government buildings had been looted, the records destroyed. Also that whatever planning the State Department had done was denied to Garner; he started from scratch. Also that Bremer fired the Baathists, which meant dismissing anyone who had any experience running the country. Imagine running New York State -- about the same size -- if every public employee was dumped, from the lieutenant governor and attorney general down to city and town mayors down to dog catchers and sanitation workers and toll collectors and state police, county, and local police.)

After the initial euphoria ("major combat operations are over"), the mission changed to (a) finding poison gas and (b) starting everything over again. Incidentally, I've met the mother of an officer who was killed clearing a road for one of the fruitless WMD search teams; stories spead. She said, by the way, that she might feel differently if he had been killed in Afghanistan, which sheltered the 9/11 attackers.

By the end of 2003, it seemed that the mission was no longer "revolution from above", but hunting Sunni bombers. Then we fought the two battles against Al Sadr, and it became clear that a major faction of Shia were against us.

By late 2006 -- four years after we began building toward the invasion -- General Petraeus announced the "surge". Looking at the daily deaths -- 30, 60 Iraqis killed each day by one faction or another -- it just seemed impossible that adding 20,000 troops could quiet things. And to reconcile the factions?

- Eric Shinseki, chief of staff in 2003, warned that it would take more than 300,000 troops several years to pacify Iraq. The government claimed it could be done with 150,000 troops in six months or so.

- The last of the Regular Army divisions are on their second year-long deployments

- Marines and Ranger units have gone four, five times or more (yes, shorter deployments)

- Many (almost all?) National Guard units have been mobilized and deployed. Guardsmen are older, have roots, and their views echo throughout the country. I recall a Pennsylvania NG company of MP's that made news around June of 2003: they were mostly big-city policemen, and they gave interviews saying "this place is falling apart". They were told to keep quiet while deployed, but opinions have a way of spreading. People listen to their neighbors, the state troopers, school teachers etc, who come back with stories and opinions.

- In late 2003, Moktada al Sadr was an oddball Shiite leader demanding that the US withdraw. Odd, but dangerous enough that he was probably behind the assasination of Sheikh Badr the head of the Supreme Council for the Iraqi Revolution (SCIRI...or "scary" as pro-democratic and non-religious Iraqis call them). In 2004, Sadr's militia fought two prolonged battles with the US military -- the Battle of Sadr City and the coup in Najaf that led to the "battle in the cemetary". Now Sadr is a major politcal leader in the country, controlling seats in parliament and having a major influence of Maliki.

- OK, that's a long post, but it starts to explain why people are sceptical about the occupation. It has always seemed wrong to use the combat army in long-term occupation of a country that did not attack us. Perle and Kristol used to say that "the terrorists have an address" so we should blow away that address.

Icarry a grudge against the people who blew up the WTC and part of the Pentagon. The 9/11 terrorists have no centralized command-and-control hierarchy. It's not like bombing Hitler's HQ. Why we decided to wipe Saddam when Osama bin Laden attacked us is a puzzle. Bin Laden's group organizes by spreading Islamic fundamentalist writings on the Internet. Google on Sayid Qtub, and read the "Karl Marx" of the Islamists. All they need to recruit is to have a complaint -- "infidels on our land" -- and a means to spread the word.

Anyway, that's enough for now.

I'll get the popcorn.

welch wrote:For starters...

Just curious welch, before this you were a law and order Republican, never thought of voting for a pinko liberal. And all of a sudden after Iraq you realized gosh, the Democrats are right, it was all that darn George Bush, and switched sides, right?

For starters:

-Thanks for taking the time in putting a thoughtful response

It's not clear what we are fighting for, so it's not clear how to say we are winning.

When you say "we" are you referring to the American soldier or American society? I know the American Soldier "should" have a clear sense of what he is fighting for in his small piece of the pie, and generally, they all understand that the ultimate goal to get the Iraqis to the point where they can secure their own country. While I will agree that for the general public the philosophical "why are we fighting" can be easily seen as not "clear." How we winning is hard to see from America. Positive steps don't make headlines and it's as simple as that. But I still don't see how the lack of a "scoreboard" leads to the "disaster/war is lost" talk.

At first, the government explanation was that we would occupy Iraq (a) to free the Iraqis from Saddam, and (b) to eliminate Saddam's stocks of poison gas which might have threatened surrounding countries, and (c) to stop his nuclear bomb program, which was said to be almost ready, and (d) because (it was hinted that) Saddam had either planned or facilitated the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

a. Was accomplished
b. Was accomplished, problem is that the public/politicians think they were never there, which isn't true.
c. Was accomplished but your right, it wasn't "almost ready"
d. Personnally, I never felt or thought the this connection was trying to be made by anyone with significant power, but that underlying tone was there. I think timing and human nature had more to do with that then politics.

I have read enough history to doubt that an army can change culture and custom just by kicking out political leaders.

Agreed. (An interesting sidenote, though. I talked to dozen of Iraqi elders who firmly believed that democracy was part of the Iraqi culture because Iraq was "democratic" before Saddam.)

The day after we took Baghdad, it became clear that the government had no idea how to govern, much less reconstruct, Iraq.

OK, now I don't completely agree with you on this, but agruing about this in regards to my initial question would have merit in 2004, not 2007.

By late 2006 -- four years after we began building toward the invasion -- General Petraeus announced the "surge". Looking at the daily deaths -- 30, 60 Iraqis killed each day by one faction or another -- it just seemed impossible that adding 20,000 troops could quiet things. And to reconcile the factions?

But it did improve things in Bagdhad. For several month this year, sectarian violence dropped and Sadr went into hiding. Now if you have a understanding of the principles on an insurgency, I would agrue that the insurgency simply moved back to phase 1 in that area, and the true payoff for the troop surge will come when they try to move back to phase 2.

- The last of the Regular Army divisions are on their second year-long deployments

- Marines and Ranger units have gone four, five times or more (yes, shorter deployments)

OK, but why does this support the disaster movement? I mean, are we really upset the Soldier, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines have spent two years in a war-zone that has been fighting for over 4 years? Sorry, but I don't buy it.

Many (almost all?) National Guard units have been mobilized and deployed. Guardsmen are older, have roots, and their views echo throughout the country. I recall a Pennsylvania NG company of MP's that made news around June of 2003: they were mostly big-city policemen, and they gave interviews saying "this place is falling apart". They were told to keep quiet while deployed, but opinions have a way of spreading. People listen to their neighbors, the state troopers, school teachers etc, who come back with stories and opinions.

Once again evidence of initial failures at the start of the war. I have no doubts that the "place" was falling apart in the first years, and the disaster belief could very well been applied then, but this doesn't support that it's a disaster now. I currently train NG unit deploying and was working for a NG brigade for part on my tour and my experience with them doesn't support that point today.

Now Sadr is a major politcal leader in the country, controlling seats in parliament and having a major influence of Maliki.

Yes, this is an insurgent strategy to create political legitimacy within their organization and it was initially successful. He and his organization, however, has been losing the political power that they gained and Maliki has begun to seperate himself from the faction.

I find your response to be very interesting and well researched but most of your agruement pertains to before the invasion or early on in the war. Are you argue that the early failures in stabalizing the country are the primary reason for viewing the situation now as being a disaster?

We can argue history all we want. I didn't want us to invade. I want us to leave the Middle East and let oil prices be set and the issues dealt with by a free market. Neither party is interested in that. The bottom line:

- We are there now. It is imperative to America we leave a viable government. If it falls when we leave, Iraq will be a rallying and recruiting point for terrorists that America can be defeated.

- That we are there is a commitment to the Iraqi people to see the job through. We can't topple their government and leave them to terrorists. And they don't want us to. Democrats tout polls saying they want us to leave, they ignore the ones saying they don't want us to leave now.

The arguments over if we are wining or losing is bilch. We won the war, we control the country, we created a government, the terrorists cannot topple it while we are there, so saying we lost or are losing is absurd. However, we can still lose if we leave and the government falls. That is the question, not the purely political posturing of if we are winning or losing.

Both parties screwed us getting in this mess and sadly when we get out neither has a rational Middle East policy and they want us to stay. So Iraq at this point is just about Iraq. We are there, we must finish the job.

1. Desertskin wrote

When you say "we" are you referring to the American soldier or American society? I know the American Soldier "should" have a clear sense of what he is fighting for in his small piece of the pie, and generally, they all understand that the ultimate goal to get the Iraqis to the point where they can secure their own country. While I will agree that for the general public the philosophical "why are we fighting" can be easily seen as not "clear." How we winning is hard to see from America. Positive steps don't make headlines and it's as simple as that. But I still don't see how the lack of a "scoreboard" leads to the "disaster/war is lost" talk.

Discussing point-by-point is good, but points get tangled quickly. If I miss, then let me know.

I'm talking about both society and Soldiers. Ultimately, the millions of civilians bear complete responsibility for how we use, or misuse the military. Civilians in the DoD decided on the war and planned it, members of congress approved. We voted for them.

My point was that the mission has changed over and over as each government explanation imploded.

2.

a. Was accomplished
b. Was accomplished, problem is that the public/politicians think they were never there, which isn't true.
c. Was accomplished but your right, it wasn't "almost ready"
d. Personnally, I never felt or thought the this connection was trying to be made by anyone with significant power, but that underlying tone was there. I think timing and human nature had more to do with that then politics.

- Yes, we tossed out Saddam, but was that necessary...except as a generally good thing to do? Was he a threat to the US? I don't believe so, although GHW Bush, Clinton, and GW Bush all had "regime change" as part of their official policy. I suspect that the policy was a mistake.

Most Americans didn't pay attention, but the last head of CENTCOM before Tommy Franks will insist that Saddam was contained. A "monster in a cage". Dangerous to Iraqis, but not but to anyone else.

- I thought that there might be at least some barrels of mustard gass (etc) laying around. It took a retired sociology professor to explain that mustard gas deteriorates over time, and that enough time had passed that Saddam had had no chance to re-stock. Saddam's poor son-in-law warned us that he had destroyed his remaining WMD about 1995, considering it useless.

- Evidence indicates that Saddam gave up his dream of a nuke just after 1991. Given the time and scientific/industrial effort it takes to construct a bomb, we probably would have had five years or more to decide to obliterate any nuke effort Saddam might have been foolish enough to re-start.

- The Saddam / bin Laden connection was hinted, suggested, etc repeatedly. Yes, human nature to make the connection, but with a push. Intelligence agencies knew better. The government talked up the supposed meeting between Al Q and Sadam's secret service...does not seem to have happened, and would have been against Saddam's and Bin Laden's long-term principles.

2. Read a great book called "Guests of the Sheikh", by Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, published about 1963 and still in print. Amazon has it at http://search.barnesandnoble.com/bookse ... 4854&itm=1
(Not that I want to advertise Amazon. B&N has it also).

She is the wife of an anthropologist who went to Iraq in 1956. It gives a clear picture of Shia Iraq before all the revolutions...like seeing a picture of an old house before a group of yuppies do a gut-rehab.

Incidcentally, my copy went bouncing around ground forces HQ in 2004.

Conclusion: Iraqi culture is very different from Anglo-American customs that underpinned the supremacy of parliament, "the rights of Englishmen" for which Boston kicked off the resistance that grew into the Revolution...all that.

The idealist Iraqi revolutionaries in 1957/58 hoped to clear away social hierarchy, clan rules, and all the rest. Tough job, and a failure -- Saddam followed a series of failed military revolutionaries.

3.

But it did improve things in Bagdhad. For several month this year, sectarian violence dropped and Sadr went into hiding. Now if you have a understanding of the principles on an insurgency, I would agrue that the insurgency simply moved back to phase 1 in that area, and the true payoff for the troop surge will come when they try to move back to phase 2.

Point is that we keep changing goals and strategy. Someone in the White House was convinced that Iraq would be a walk-over, like Grenada, perhaps.

For the surge to work, I think we need enough troops to put an American soldier on every street-corner. Far more than we have in the Regular Army...and the Guard can only be used once. No deployments every two or three years.

Bombings and kidnap/murders seem to have increased. Lately, killings have increased.

Further, how long can we keep even an extra 20,000 in Baghdad? What then?

4. Repeated deployments, aka "increased op-tempo". Wears people down. The army we've built seems intended to knock down another conventional army and its government, but long-term occupation is different. I believe that the Soldiers will do anything the country asks, but that's different than having a military that knows its mission, and is enthusiastic. It appears that Soldiers grit their teeth, do what orders require, but Congress, DoD, Satet Department, and White Hiuse pay little attention to the risk, the sacrifice, the general grinding that it takes out of people.

The Army is not very big -- 500,000 regulars, maybe another 500,000 ARNG and Reserves. People move from station to station, and word travels. In the smaller MOS's, everyone knows someone who who knows someone who knows....etc.

By now -- my impression -- Soldiers are loyal to each other to their unit, and Soldiers are "checking off a box" when they get deployment orders. Even genrrals appear to have little influence.

Again, the trouble is finding a mission.

5. NG: Same as Regulars. Yes, people go when called...they have promised. Typical NG is 10 years older (or more) than then 19-year-old regular army private. NG Soldiers have have roots...jobs, wife/husband/kids. They coach Little League, serve on town councils, lead church groups, hold jobs. It punches a hole in the community when someone leaves for a year. Even worse when someone is killed (example: friend of mine is married to NY NG member --- 42ID -- who trained with the two officers who were killed by one of their soldiers in 2005. One was a star school teacher. It hurts the community, and everyone who knew him.)

6. Disaster? No. I think we began with one goal in mind -- install a new government -- and now find ourselves in the middle of a Sunni/Shia bloodbath. Seems endless.

I'm not sure we can call it an insurgency anymore. Even when it was officially an insurgency, note the conclusions by both Pete Chiarelli and Tom Metz. Iraq is a clan culture. Suni clans spill back into Syria. Kill a Sunni, and their cousins are required, by honor, to kill five of ours. Same with Shia, except that the clans spread to Iran.

Chiarelli and Metz argued that it did little good to kill an insurgent, because that simply created more. (Speaking to the same middle-eastern culture, Rabbi Jesse ben Joseph, also called Jesus the Christ, said much the same thing 2000 years ago).

Now the Iraqi factions slaughter each other. Maybe the "surge" will stop it, but I don't see much evidence yet.

[edited for typos]

So welch, OK, so you go on and on about how incompetent Bush is. OK, amazing, somehow we elected an incompetent politician. What are the odds of that? Actually since his opponents were Gore and Kerry, the odds were 100% either way.

But my question is what do you want to DO. If it were up to you, where would we go from here? What would your middle east policy be and what would your oil policy be? You cannot separate them.

Remember I want to leave the middle east and keep government out of oil and let our industry deal with energy. What would you do?

KazooSkinsFan wrote:- We are there now. It is imperative to America we leave a viable government. If it falls when we leave, Iraq will be a rallying and recruiting point for terrorists that America can be defeated.

- That we are there is a commitment to the Iraqi people to see the job through. We can't topple their government and leave them to terrorists. And they don't want us to. Democrats tout polls saying they want us to leave, they ignore the ones saying they don't want us to leave now.

It will be years if not decades before troops could leave the region and not worry about the goverment that they installed wouldn't fall, still nothing to say it still won't happen.

KazooSkinsFan wrote:The arguments over if we are wining or losing is bilch. We won the war, we control the country, we created a government, the terrorists cannot topple it while we are there, so saying we lost or are losing is absurd. However, we can still lose if we leave and the government falls. That is the question, not the purely political posturing of if we are winning or losing.

You can say we won the war but can still lose it, if we can still lose it than it hasn't been won.

KazooSkinsFan wrote:Both parties screwed us getting in this mess and sadly when we get out neither has a rational Middle East policy and they want us to stay. So Iraq at this point is just about Iraq. We are there, we must finish the job.

Iraq at this point SHOULD be about Iraq but as you keep pointing out U.S. politics keep getting in the way.

Unfortunately the U.S. Military has and will continue to be the enforcers of U.S. foriegn policy. The people on the Hill will have to figure out what that policy is sooner or later. Once they stop pointing fingers at each other they might figure out what they are suppose to do.

1niksder wrote:

KazooSkinsFan wrote:The arguments over if we are wining or losing is bilch. We won the war, we control the country, we created a government, the terrorists cannot topple it while we are there, so saying we lost or are losing is absurd. However, we can still lose if we leave and the government falls. That is the question, not the purely political posturing of if we are winning or losing.

You can say we won the war but can still lose it, if we can still lose it than it hasn't been won.

- The war is over, we won. We militarily defeated the enemy on the field of combat.

- America would lose if the government falls when we leave because as I said it would be a rallying cry and recruiting for terrorists. I didn't mean we would go back and lose the "war," just that we would lose in that we would be harmed.

OK, so let me rephrase. We cannot lose the war, it's already over, we won. America can still be greatly harmed if we leave and the government falls. Was that really that confusing?

But I thought this was a war on terror?

It's a matter of semantics, but I reckon that makes Iraq a battle within the "war", rather than a war in itself.

That probably doesn't add anything to the debate, but the offseason is long, and there's nothing on TV.

I personally think the best way to deal with the insurgencies and sectarian violence is to split the country three ways. I believe you have to look at what worked in that region before, it did wonders for India. There will of course be some hot spots of violence the Iraqis will have their cashmere but at least they will be totally centralized. Unfortunately India had a great leader in Gandhi and I think it will have to be the Iraqis that propose the split for it to really work and not to be severally resented. I think we have to keep our distance as far as something like that goes, but if the split happens it will be better for the country. I also think if that happens the Kurdish nation will be our new Israel. And that might not be so bad. The worst part is we are going to have permanent bases there no matter what happens. We still have them in Germany, Cuba, many countries in South America, and Japan so it’s inevitable that we will in some sense always be there.

KazooSkinsFan wrote: If it falls when we leave, Iraq will be a rallying and recruiting point for terrorists that America can be defeated.

Every once in a blue moon...you say something that I can handle.

tcwest10 wrote:

KazooSkinsFan wrote: If it falls when we leave, Iraq will be a rallying and recruiting point for terrorists that America can be defeated.

Every once in a blue moon...you say something that I can handle.

What usually bothers you? I just advocate people over government. And that includes opposing government because SOME people say they want government. I have observed the obvious. Even if the end is desireable, government is too inept, corrupt and inefficient to do it.

BTW, if you answer and I don't answer for a few weeks I apologize. Given that it's offseason and I'm in the middle of a move I probably won't be back on until late June. So whatever bothers you won't temporarily anyway.

...Recall that the neo-conservatives in the DoD "re-evaluated" intelligence reports to eliminate any that said it might be risky as invade Iraq. As actual events (strange concept, but it contrasts with fictionalized reported events), as actual events disprove most of the case for overthrowing Saddam, more and more Americans lose faith in the Administrations's ever-changing goal and explanation.

Assessments Made in 2003 Foretold Situation in Iraq
Intelligence Studies List Internal Violence, Terrorist Activity

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 20, 2007; A06



Two intelligence assessments from January 2003 predicted that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and subsequent U.S. occupation of Iraq could lead to internal violence and provide a boost to Islamic extremists and terrorists in the region, according to congressional sources and former intelligence officials familiar with the prewar studies.

The two assessments, titled "Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq" and "Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq," were produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and will be a major part of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's long-awaited Phase II report on prewar intelligence assessments about Iraq. The assessments were delivered to the White House and to congressional intelligence committees before the war started.

The committee chairman, Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), and the vice chairman, Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.), announced earlier this month that the panel had asked Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to declassify the report for public release. Congressional sources said the two NIC assessments are to be declassified and would be part of a portion of the Phase II report that could be released within the next week.

The assessment on post-Hussein Iraq included judgments that while Iraq was unlikely to split apart, there was a significant chance that domestic groups would fight each other and that ex-regime military elements could merge with terrorist groups to battle any new government. It even talks of guerrilla warfare, according to congressional sources and former intelligence officials.

The second NIC assessment discussed "political Islam being boosted and the war being exploited by terrorists and extremists elsewhere in the region," one former senior analyst said. It also suggested that fear of U.S. military dominance and occupation of a Middle East country -- one sacred to Islam -- would attract foreign Islamic fighters to the area.

The NIC assessments paint "a very sobering and, as it has turned out, mostly accurate picture of the aftermath of the invasion," according to a former senior intelligence officer familiar with the studies. He sought anonymity because he is not authorized to speak about still-classified assessments.

The former senior official said that after the NIC papers were distributed to senior government officials, he was told by one CIA briefer that a senior Defense Department official had said they were "too negative" and that the papers "did not see the possibilities" the removal of Hussein would present.

A member of the Senate committee, without disclosing the contents of the studies, said recently that the release will raise more questions about the Bush administration's lack of preparation for the war's aftermath.

<snip>

Tenet writes that the initial good feeling among most Iraqis that Hussein was out of power "would last for only a short time before old rivalries and ancient ethnic tensions resurfaced." The former intelligence analyst said such views also reflected the views in the NIC paper on post-Hussein Iraq.

The NIC assessments also projected the view that a long-term Western military occupation would be widely unacceptable, particularly to the Iraqi military. It also said Iraqis would wait and see whether the new governing authority, whether foreign or Iraqi, would provide security and basic services such as water and electricity.

<snip>

full article in today's Post at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... id=topnews

DesertSkin wrote:Why is that the prevailing belief?

The key word was highlighted.

In a nutshell?

Because the USA has the most effective and powerful fighting force in the entire world designed to win decisive battles and wars very quickly.

And conversely,

Because it has the least effective and most ill-prepared and expensive fighting force in the entire world designed to fight a prolonged, ill-defined, insurgency war of attrition ...

... in the global communication instant soundbite news/Internet electronic world.

Support for decisive actions are popular. The times of a Theodore Roosevelt's "quick good war" like the Spanish War of 1889 are long gone.

The high cost of a prolonged conflict, on the other hand, has been unbearable since the early 70's.

We are in the second -prevailing- stage.

If we win this war, what's going to change?

DesertSkin wrote:I'd like to ask you all a question on the current public perception on Iraq.

Throughout all the political debates, media coverage, and general public opinion on Iraq, the overwhelming theme/belief is that what is currently happening is a complete disaster and a mess. Why is that the prevailing belief?

I've been there, studies counter-insurgency fights and principals and looked at some historical examples of counter-insurgencies (both successful and unsuccessful), and can only come to the opinion that the war is actually going quite well from a military stand point. I just can't understand why public perception is the complete opposite and would like some viewpoint to help me understand it.

What military standpoint? We're already ousted Saddam and failed to prevent a civil war which is raging around us. Are we expected to stop their civil war and render them peaceful? Are we supposed to take over Iraq? Is our goal to create a peaceful democracy that will support us: if so, how can you say the war is going well-- we lose, no matter which faction wins. They all hate us. We've killed, jailed, and tortured far too many of them for them to forgive us in our lifetimes. We'll be lucky to get out of this one without causing a World War. Plus: we have no allies left, massive debt, a horribly divided country and thousands of injured and dead.

Because it has the least effective and most ill-prepared and expensive fighting force in the entire world designed to fight a prolonged, ill-defined, insurgency war of attrition ...

I'm not certain you are adequately informed to make this comment. It is completely inaccurate. The US military is superbly equipped and prepared for assymetrical warfare (this is not a war of attrition, except from the point of view of the thugs). The mission remains defined... that you may not (I assume "do not") agree with it does not make it "ill-defined'..

That the political will to fight does not exist does not impugn the military. The question is not "can the military win this?", but "are people willing to pay the price in order to complete what they have started?".

Countertrey wrote:I'm not certain you are adequately informed to make this comment. It is completely inaccurate.

Name -one- prolonged conflict of an asymmetrical nature where the US troops came out victorious. not in a few battles but the war as a whole. One.

The US armed forces are invincible in open decisive warfare today. They are the most vulnerable in prolonged insurgency and urban warfare.

I will not get into the political side of this debate. I try to avoid these political threads. But I can write a bit on conflict resolution and look at the issue hopefully from a military/pacification perspective alone (impossible, I know, but let's try as much as possible).

The US military is superbly equipped and prepared for asymmetrical warfare

I disagree. The vast majority of US soldiers do not speak the language, do not share the religion, culture and values, and they have alienated all major military and ethnic groups.

If you mean equipped as in satellite imagery, vehicles, hardware, ... maybe. I still do not feel that all the equipment is necessarily ideal for asymmetrical dessert insurgency and urban warfare. Very expensive as established in my original message, just not necessarily optimal.

But a prolonged conflict is -not- only about military targets and objectives. It is -MAINLY- about winning the hearts and minds of the population on the ground. That is where your -main- source of really valuable intelligence comes from. That is where the enemy recruits new members. Interesting paradox: To win the war, peace needs to be consolidated.

Judging by this standard, how well equipped are the US forces?

(this is not a war of attrition, except from the point of view of the thugs).

Oh, but it is. That is the strategy of the enemy. Every time the media shows a coffin flown in, every time that a bomb kills another soldier, every time anybody is abducted, the US population counts the numbers in terms of casualties, in terms of months and years, in terms of billions of dollars. Failure to recognise the enemy's strategy would be a grave mistake.

The mission remains defined... that you may not (I assume "do not") agree with it does not make it "ill-defined'..

I deal with the facts. I do not deal with what I would like to agree or disagree with. My opinion is irrelevant to the military or political development of the process.

I disagree with the clarity with which you seem to perceive the terms of this mission. That is one of the main roots of today's dilemma. I do not find two politicians in Washington that give the same answer on this issue. And I find many military analysts that would like to give a few different reformulations of the mission at this point.

That the political will to fight does not exist does not impugn the military.

We disagree again. Military morale is very important to many at home and on the battlefield. Please do not make me bring an example from the 60's and early 70's.

The question is not "can the military win this?", but "are people willing to pay the price in order to complete what they have started?".

And the tragic historic answer is NO. A conflict like this should not even have a deadline in order to succeed. And you and I know that the American people and the politicians will not leave the door open to do the job right and to bring PEACE to the region by winning the population over.

The best-known prolonged war of the 20th century resulted in ALL major military victories to one side. Need I add that this is the same side that lost that war? The US is not the first country to fight prolonged wars in history. Britain, France and Spain have fought many of them in the past. There are some very good lessons to be learned from history. I enjoy particularly the French perspective on this issue, please see for example the work of Jean Larteguy and some of the commentariesabout France's hard-earned experiences.

My point is that true victory lies in conflict resolution and to a much lesser extent to success on the battlefield.

I don't claim to be completely informed about the military, but I do read, listen, and watch.

1. From what I've seen, the question is whether the US military can occupy Iraq and remain the US military; it is not a matter of winning a face-to-face war. The Germans managed to occupy much of Europe, but they did it by their methods...hostages, mass reprisals, plain massacres. Do we want to do the same?

Our military is built to blow things up. It is not a heavily armed police force. To pacify Iraq, I believe we would need a different Army...something like a colonial constabulary, perhaps 1 million men, trained as "peace officers", and all of them able to speak Arabic.

This seems unlikely; certainly not possible for American Soldiers and Marines.

Point: we cannot hold down a country once its people reach the ppoint that they don't want us there -- not without German methods.

2. The military we have, and should have, is wearing down. We are now into the fifth year of occupation. Army divisions serve 12 month deployments, or longer. All have been deployed at least twice. (Marines served shorter deployments more often). A deployment is a horrific strain on a Soldier and his or her family. Doing it twice, with no end in sight, is draining.

3. How much longer can we keep doing this?

4. The recent DoD Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) found many interesting things about the military.

For Soldiers, deployment length and family separation were the top non-combat deployment issues, wheras Marines had fewer non-compat deployment issues, probably because of their shorter deployment periods,

said MG Gale Pollock, acting surgeon general of the Army, in speaking about MHAT.

Fifteen-month deployments will be stressful for service-members, Pollock acknowledged

(which is why it is perplexing that the Army has chosen 15-month deployments, in contrast to the Marines.)

Of those surveyed, 10 percent of Soldiers and Marines reported mistreating noncombatants or damaging property when it was not necessary....

The survey also found only 47 oercent of Soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect.

These findings seem alarming, Pollock said, but it is important to keep them in perspective. These troops have been seeing their friends killed and injured, and anger is a normal reaction. However, what's important to note is that the troops who had these thoughts did not act on them or mistreat any noncombatants.

Soldiers experienced mental heath problems at a higher rate than Marines

Deployment length was directly linked to morale problems in the Army.

Both Soldiers and Marines reported at relatively high rates -- 62 and 66 percent respectively -- that they knew someone seriously injured of killed, or that a member of their team had become a casualty.

Multiple deployers reported higer acute stress than first-time deployers. Deployment length was related to higher rates of mental health and marital problems.

(Fort Hood Sentinal, 10 May, 2007, p A4)

5. Human stories?

- At Fort Hood a veteran Soldier returned from deployment and killed his wife

- Also at Hood, a young Soldier returned form deployment and decided to steal his captain's pickup truck. He also murdered the captain.

- Also at Hood, a young returned Soldier used his deployment money to buy a fast car. One evening he got overwhelmingly drunk, and decided to make a right-angle turn onto the base, at more than 90 mph. His car jumped a curb, clipped of the top of a brick wall, and collided with an Abrams tank that serves as a corner-stone. The tank didn't move.

- An infantry captain, son of a friend of mine, was in the original invasion. In 2003, his humvee was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade or small missle. The trooper behind him was killed instantly, his driver lost both arms, and the captain suffered a ton of superficial cuts. Pure luck. During the '05 deployment, he had "garrison support" duty, meaning that he visited the wounded from his division, and escorted bodies from Dover to their funerals. One wounded Soldier was his ex-driver, who now sits alone. Simply sits. The captain's mother said that he would rather be shot at.

6. All of this grinds people down.

Name -one- prolonged conflict of an asymmetrical nature where the US troops came out victorious. not in a few battles but the war as a whole. One.

The American Revolution. Now I get your point, we we're on the other side of that war and it's been a couple centuries since the US has won in an assymetric war. Now that being said, I challenge you to prove that these losses (I'm assuming that your talking about Vietnam and maybe Somalia to some extent) were military defeats. Defeats they were, but there are ways to win wars without defeating your opponents military. Most will argue that a war is a battle of wills. With that in mind, there are three seperate battles ongoing in any war. The military will, the political will, and the social will. Defeat destroy any of these will of the opposing nation/enemy and you win the war. Vietnam was a lose because the NV was able to defeat our societies will for the war which toppled the political will and resulted in the withdrawl of our military from the country. I'd argue that we were about 2 years away from winning when we withdrew, but that another topic altogether.

They are the most vulnerable in prolonged insurgency and urban warfare.

Your correct here, but I don't think that this vulnerability lies necessarily in our ability to fight it, but rather because we are, as you've and others eluded to or flat out said, in a society that does not stomach prolonged combat operations. An insurgency simple does not attack soldiers in an attempt to defeat the military. They attack soldiers to erode at the societal and political will of that country. Insurgents will always trade space for time because the longer that war goes on, the more societies will for the war deminishes. Insurgencies historically take decades to defeat if you do not destroy them immediately. The failure to identify the existence of an insurgency and quickly destroy it has been the biggest military failure of this war. That, however, does not mean that the war is lost or that the war is going badly right now. Problem is, we're in the stage were it will be years or decades to win.

they have alienated all major military and ethnic groups

I'm not understanding what your saying here. How have US Soldiers done this?? I'm not saying your wrong, but I cannot think of any examples that would support your statement, so I assuming I'm not understanding what your trying to say.

But a prolonged conflict is -not- only about military targets and objectives.

Your absolutely right with your intent here as I hope I've demonstrated above.

It is -MAINLY- about winning the hearts and minds of the population on the ground.

Your right about this for our counterinsurgency. This war would be over tomorrow if the populace would outright support us and turnin all the insurgents. The insurgency, however, could care less about winning the hearts and minds. They are focused on two strategic objectives; preventing us from winning the Iraqi hearts and mind (ie continually demonstrate that the government cannot protect the populace), and destroying our society's will for the war. The first is why they are trying to create a civil war and the second is why they try to make the war last as long as necessary.

Quote:
(this is not a war of attrition, except from the point of view of the thugs).
Oh, but it is. That is the strategy of the enemy. Every time the media shows a coffin flown in, every time that a bomb kills another soldier, every time anybody is abducted, the US population counts the numbers in terms of casualties, in terms of months and years, in terms of billions of dollars. Failure to recognise the enemy's strategy would be a grave mistake.

I get your point and completely agree with your intent, but it is not a war of attrition. By defination a war of attrition is focused on resources and the insurgency is not trying to attrite our nations resources (not even the soldiers if you consider us to be a resource). Your point of coffins, bombs, and money supports the war of wills and your right, failure to recognize this is a grave mistake. I personnally think that our society IS failing to see this and that's a mistake.

And the tragic historic answer is NO. A conflict like this should not even have a deadline in order to succeed. And you and I know that the American people and the politicians will not leave the door open to do the job right and to bring PEACE to the region by winning the population over.

BINGO. And this is why I posed the orginal question. I recognized this and was, ultimately, wondered why. As I stated in my orginal post, if you compare our current counterinsurgency fight with other counterinsurgencies throughout history (you've gotta compare apples to apples here), I think we're doing quite well. So why does the majority of the public see it the other way???? I think the thread went off topic early, but I also believe it going off topic went a long way to answering my question. I don't think the American public feels the orginal invasion was justified in hindsight, and thus, no longer want to win the war it evolved into. Now that's a fair opinion, but I also fear that people are failing to seperate the "If we should stay" with the "why did we go."

CLL wrote:

If we win this war, what's going to change?

Fair question. I'll argue that the current enemy (Islamic extremist) is, too, fighting a global war. Winning this war will not likely defeat them. But I will argue, lossing will only make them stronger. Winning will go a long way to ultimately defeating them, but they will attack again regardless. I don't know, I just think in the long run, it will be easier to defeat them with a stable and non-terrorist supporting Iraq. I hope I'm wrong, but fear I'm right.


A sincere thanks to all for your input.[/quote]

they have alienated all major military and ethnic groups.

If you mean equipped as in satellite imagery, vehicles, hardware, ... maybe. I still do not feel that all the equipment is necessarily ideal for asymmetrical dessert insurgency and urban warfare. Very expensive as established in my original message, just not necessarily optimal.

But a prolonged conflict is -not- only about military targets and objectives. It is -MAINLY- about winning the hearts and minds of the population on the ground. That is where your -main- source of really valuable intelligence comes from. That is where the enemy recruits new members. Interesting paradox: To win the war, peace needs to be consolidated.

Judging by this standard, how well equipped are the US forces?

Depends upon whom you believe. The soldiers will tell you that they are well received by the VAST majority of Iraqis. The exceptions are still in limited areas. The numbers of weapons and IED's exposed to the military by locals is astonishing. Intellegence is often spontaineous. There is a reason for that. You may chose to believe otherwise. The reality is, most want us to succeed, because that means two things... they have a safe democracy, and we leave.

Additionally, you have NO idea the amount of energy that is placed into training for specific missions. Your knowledge is based upon what you read and see on TV. Mine is based upon doing it for many years. I know I'll not convince you. I'm not multimedia, colorful, and recognizable. I even stuggle myself to not believe everything they say... fotunately, I have a bunch of people in boots who tell me what they see.

You will also, no doubt, get a response from the author of this thread. He is one of those people. It may take a bit, however. He is currently in Wisconsin, providing guidance to soldiers over the next several months, in preparation for their deployment. He knows much better than I what is involved in preparing soldiers for these deployments. And, he knows much better than I (and others here) what it is really like in Baghdad.

Name -one- prolonged conflict of an asymmetrical nature where the US troops came out victorious. not in a few battles but the war as a whole. One.

Red herring. If the political will to succeed fails, it does not matter how effective the soldiers are. The Vietnamese have admitted that they could not have persisted much longer. We were winning militarily. Tet was a disaster for the NVA and VC. The outcome of the war was political. The soldiers did what they were supposed to do, and did it very well. Our soldiers are good at assymetrical warfare... our civilians are not. You will notice, that I have not once mentioned the "equipment" you felt necessary to point out. While it is valuable, what is important, is the people on the ground. And, they are excellent.

Countertrey wrote: The reality is, most want us to succeed, because that means two things... they have a safe democracy, and we leave.

A democracy? A -safe- democracy? I have worked in the region. This has to be one of the biggest miscalculations in the whole adventure. Not in my book. Not to democracy and certainly not safe.

Your knowledge is based upon what you read and see on TV.

Is that so?

He knows much better than I what is involved in preparing soldiers for these deployments. And, he knows much better than I (and others here) what it is really like in Baghdad.

Fine people without doubt.

Our soldiers are good at assymetrical warfare... our civilians are not.

I doubt the first part to the extent that a victory does not depend upon military operations alone, but I definitely agree with the second part. I know that this discussion is difficult and painful. It has to be when some of you have experienced what you have. We see eye to eye. I know where you stand. I only offer an alternative perspective. You know where I stand.